WebForensik

Results for https://www.supa.de/

Scan time: 2026-06-11 01:22:02

Overall Score

GDPR Summary

✔ This website meets basic data protection requirements.

Note: This automated analysis does not replace legal advice. For a complete GDPR assessment, consult a data protection officer.

↓ See detailed results for each category below.

100 HTTPS / Encryption

The website uses an encrypted connection (HTTPS).

Latest encryption active (TLS 1.3 — TLSv1.3).

The security certificate is valid (expires 2026-09-05).

Strong encryption method (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 256 bit).

80 Enforced Encryption (HSTS)

HSTS is enabled — the browser is instructed to always use the encrypted connection.

HSTS duration: 31536000 seconds (at least 1 year) — very good.

60 Content Security Policy (CSP)

Content Security Policy present (via HTTP-Header).

Inline scripts allowed (unsafe-inline). Weakens XSS protection for inline code; the other CSP directives still protect.⚠ Mandatory when running WORDPRESS — required by WordPress itself.

☛ Action needed: Remove 'unsafe-inline' from your CSP and use nonces or hashes for inline scripts instead. Your web developer can implement this.

▸ How to fix this — step-by-step guide

Your CSP allows "unsafe-inline" for scripts — this largely defeats XSS protection. Solution: sign inline scripts with a nonce or hash instead of allowing them wholesale. This is technically demanding — a job for your web developer.

WordPress Special for WordPress: where to add this

WordPress plugin: WordPress themes often emit inline scripts via wp_localize_script() or plugin output. Pragmatic interim step: keep "unsafe-inline" for now, but gradually externalize inline scripts to .js files. Pro solution: plugin "WP Content Security Policy & Headers" with nonce support.

✓ How to verify it works: Once nonce-based CSP is active: F12 → Console — no more "Refused to execute inline script…" messages.

Embedding protection (frame-ancestors) is configured — protects against clickjacking.

Good base rule: only own content is allowed by default (default-src: self).

↓ SHOW COMPLETE SOLUTION All missing security headers bundled at the end of the report — ready to copy.

100 Referrer Policy

Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin (via HTTP-Header).

Strict setting "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" — no path leak, no HTTP downgrade leak. Best practice.

100 MIME Type Protection

MIME type protection active (nosniff) — browsers will not misinterpret files.

100 Clickjacking Protection

Clickjacking protection active via CSP frame-ancestors.

100 Permissions (Camera, Microphone, etc.)

Permissions-Policy is configured — access to sensitive device APIs is controlled.

6 of 6 sensitive APIs restricted — very good.

100 Cookies

No cookies set — exemplary for privacy.

70 Local Storage (Web Storage)

2 localStorage and 0 sessionStorage item(s) found.

localStorage

Name	Value
i18nextLng	de
readabler	{}

100 Third-Party Requests

No third-party requests detected — all content comes from the website's own server.

100 Tracker Detection

No known trackers detected.

100 External Resource Integrity (SRI)

No external scripts or stylesheets loaded.

50 DNS Security

No CAA records. Any certificate authority could issue a certificate for this domain.

☛ Action needed: Create CAA DNS records to specify which certificate authorities may issue certificates for your domain. This prevents unauthorized certificates from being issued.

▸ How to fix this — step-by-step guide

CAA records (Certification Authority Authorization) define in DNS which Certificate Authorities are allowed to issue certificates for your domain. Without a CAA record an attacker could request a fraudulent certificate for your domain at any CA. CAA is pure DNS configuration — set in your registrar/DNS-panel, NOT in WordPress.

☞ Concrete CAA values for the ten most common DACH-region hosts

Find your host in the table, copy the values to your DNS panel. For multi-CA hosts: one separate CAA record per CA (all with tag issue, flag 0, name @). Additionally recommended: an iodef record with a contact email for abuse reports.

#	Host	CA(s) used	CAA value(s) — tag `issue`
1	Hetzner Webhosting (basic certificate, free in package)	DigiCert (programme „Encryption Everywhere")	`digicert.com`
1	Hetzner Webhosting (Let’s Encrypt, free)	Let’s Encrypt (ISRG)	`letsencrypt.org`
2	All-Inkl	Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo (Pro)	`letsencrypt.org` `sectigo.com`
3	IONOS (1&1)	DigiCert (GeoTrust) + Let’s Encrypt	`digicert.com` `letsencrypt.org`
4	STRATO	Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt	`sectigo.com` `letsencrypt.org`
5	Cloudflare (Universal SSL)	Google Trust Services + DigiCert + Let’s Encrypt	`pki.goog` `digicert.com` `letsencrypt.org`
6	AWS (ACM / CloudFront)	Amazon Trust Services	`amazon.com` `amazontrust.com` `awstrust.com` `amazonaws.com`
7	Mittwald	Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo	`letsencrypt.org` `sectigo.com`
8	Webgo	Let’s Encrypt + Sectigo	`letsencrypt.org` `sectigo.com`
9	raidboxes (Managed WordPress)	Let’s Encrypt	`letsencrypt.org`
10	Host Europe / DomainFactory	Sectigo + Let’s Encrypt	`sectigo.com` `letsencrypt.org`

Name   Type   Flag   Tag      Value
@      CAA    0      issue    "digicert.com"
@      CAA    0      issue    "letsencrypt.org"
@      CAA    0      iodef    "mailto:security@your-domain.com"

The iodef line (last line) is optional but recommended: CAs report abuse attempts to that address. For subdomains (e.g. shop.your-domain.com) create separate records with the subdomain name instead of @ — modern CAs check parent CAA automatically though.

If your host is not on the list: open your current certificate in the browser (padlock → certificate → issuer). The CA name is shown there (e.g. "Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" → value sectigo.com). Add that as a CAA record, done.

WordPress Special for WordPress: where to add this

WordPress plugin: CAA records are NOT created in WordPress but in your domain registrar / DNS provider panel (e.g. Hetzner-Robot, IONOS Domains, Cloudflare Dashboard, INWX, etc.). Common label: "CAA record" or under "TXT records" with type selector "CAA". One separate record per CA.

✓ How to verify it works: On https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=your-domain.com → "DNS CAA" section → all your CAs should be listed. Or via dig: dig CAA your-domain.com.

No IPv6 support (no AAAA record).

☛ Action needed: Enable IPv6 support (AAAA records) for your domain. More and more users are using IPv6.

▸ How to fix this — step-by-step guide

Your domain has no IPv6 address (AAAA record). Over 40% of users (especially mobile) reach the internet via IPv6 — they must take the slower IPv4 gateway detour.

WordPress Special for WordPress: where to add this

WordPress plugin: Pure DNS + server matter. Step 1: check if your host has an IPv6 address for you (hosting panel or support ticket). Step 2: in the DNS panel create an AAAA record pointing to that IPv6. Step 3: test.

✓ How to verify it works: dig AAAA your-domain.com — or online https://ipv6-test.com/validate.php?url=your-domain.com.

No SPF record. Emails can be forged in the name of this domain.

☛ Action needed: Create an SPF DNS record (TXT) to specify which servers may send emails on behalf of your domain. Example: v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all

▸ How to fix this — step-by-step guide

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) defines in DNS which servers may send emails on behalf of your domain. Without SPF any phisher can spoof emails from you — and recipients are more likely to fall for them.

WordPress Special for WordPress: where to add this

WordPress plugin: DNS matter, not WordPress. Create a TXT record in your DNS panel. Examples: If you send NO emails: v=spf1 -all (reject all senders). If only your host sends: v=spf1 a mx ~all. If Google Workspace: v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all. If Microsoft 365: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all.

✓ How to verify it works: dig TXT your-domain.com | grep spf — or online https://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html.

No DMARC record. The domain is vulnerable to email phishing.

☛ Action needed: Create a DMARC DNS record at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. DMARC protects against phishing and email spoofing. Example: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourdomain.com

▸ How to fix this — step-by-step guide

DMARC combines SPF and DKIM into an explicit instruction for receiving mail servers: "What to do if emails claim to come from us but SPF/DKIM fail?" Without DMARC each server decides — usually generously. With DMARC=reject you effectively prevent phishing in your name.

WordPress Special for WordPress: where to add this

WordPress plugin: DNS matter. TXT record at subdomain _dmarc.your-domain.com. Recommended stages: Observe first: v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@your-domain.com — review reports for weeks. Then tighten: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=… — suspicious mails go to spam. Final: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=… — they’re refused outright.

✓ How to verify it works: dig TXT _dmarc.your-domain.com — or online https://dmarcian.com/dmarc-inspector/.

100 Security Contact (security.txt)

security.txt found: https://www.supa.de/.well-known/security.txt

Contact field present (required) — security researchers can report vulnerabilities.

Expires field present (required).

Preferred languages specified.

100 External Reporting Endpoints

No external reporting endpoints detected.

70 Cookie Consent

Cookie consent system detected: Klaro, klaro.

Consent system detected, but banner does not appear to be visible.

☛ Action needed: The consent system does not appear to be visible. Ensure the cookie banner is displayed on the first visit and is not hidden by CSS or JavaScript.

▸ How to fix this — step-by-step guide

Your consent system is wired up but the banner doesn’t appear visibly — perhaps hidden by another plugin or custom CSS. Risk: without a visible banner, no consent is given.

WordPress Special for WordPress: where to add this

WordPress plugin: Approach: 1) clear browser cache + cookies, use incognito. 2) In the consent plugin: check display conditions (e.g. "only EU visitors" — and you’re testing from a non-EU server). 3) F12 → Console for red errors from consent scripts. 4) Inspector → search DOM for "cookie", "consent" — element present but display:none? z-index too low? 5) Uninstall conflicting cookie-notice plugins.

✓ How to verify it works: Incognito tab, load page, wait 5 seconds — banner visible centered/bottom, doesn’t fully block main content, is clickable.

100 Privacy Policy & Legal Notice

Legal notice linked: "Impressum" (/impressum).

⚙ Your ready-to-use security .htaccess

All missing security headers combined into one block. Append this block to the end of your .htaccess — done. 1 headers will be set.

⚠ Why this recommendation does NOT give a 100% score — and why that's how it is with WordPress

The Content-Security-Policy above deliberately includes 'unsafe-inline' for both style-src and script-src. This does NOT provide full XSS protection — it's a pragmatic trade-off, not a bug.

Why? A typical WordPress setup (theme + 5-15 plugins) emits 10-50 different inline <script> blocks into the HTML: jQuery init, slider init, cookie banner, tracking, GTM, web vitals, lazy-load, speculation rules and so on. A strict script-src 'self' blocks them all — the site becomes visually and functionally broken (blank slider, broken cookie banner, dead plugins).

Consequence for scoring: Sites running WordPress with plugins can score at most ~75-85 points in the CSP category in this app — the full 100% rating is only achievable when inline code is signed via nonce or hash (technically demanding, breaks on every theme/plugin update).

Paths to full XSS protection (in increasing complexity):

Plugin "WP Content Security Policy & Headers" — automatically adds nonces to inline scripts (medium effort, cleanest WP solution).
Hash-based CSP — whitelist every inline script via SHA-256 in the CSP (fragile, breaks on updates).
Externalize inline scripts — rebuild theme/plugins so no inline JS is emitted (huge effort, often impossible).

Anyone who doesn't take one of these paths lives with 'unsafe-inline' — like about 95% of all production WordPress sites on the web. The other CSP directives still protect: default-src 'self' blocks external resources, object-src 'none' bans Flash/Java, frame-ancestors 'self' prevents clickjacking, base-uri 'self' prevents base-tag hijacking. Not maximum protection, but realistic protection for WP reality.

Apache Standard Apache (any host, without WordPress)

Append this block to the end of your .htaccess in the web root — done.

<IfModule mod_headers.c>
    Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
</IfModule>

WordPress WordPress: .htaccess in WP root

Insert this block ABOVE the "# BEGIN WordPress" line, otherwise WP overwrites it on permalink changes.

# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
    Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security

WordPress Alternative for WordPress: functions.php in child theme

If your host disallows .htaccess changes: append this PHP snippet to the end of your CHILD theme's functions.php. Back up first — NEVER edit the parent theme, it gets overwritten on updates.

add_action('send_headers', function () {
    header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
});

Dry-run — we re-load your site with the proposed headers and show which resources would be blocked. Takes about 30 seconds.

HTTP Response Headers

Header	Value
accept-ranges	bytes
cache-control	max-age=0, no-cache
content-encoding	gzip
content-language	de-DE
content-length	22828
content-security-policy	default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://calendly.com https://.calendly.com; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://.du-omnistore.de https://.googletagmanager.com https://.google-analytics.com https://*.analytics.google.com https:
content-type	text/html; charset=utf-8
date	Wed, 10 Jun 2026 23:21:54 GMT
permissions-policy	camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()
referrer-policy	strict-origin-when-cross-origin
server	Apache
strict-transport-security	max-age=31536000
vary	Accept-Encoding
x-content-type-options	nosniff
x-frame-options	SAMEORIGIN
x-mod-pagespeed	1.14.36.1-0
x-sfc-tags	pages_8036, pages_8084, pages_8091, pages_8090, pages_8089, pages_8088, pages_8065, pages_8072, pages_8071, pages_8070, pages_8069, pages_8067, pages_8066, pages_8073, pages_8083, pages_8082, pages_8081, pages_8080, pages_8079, pages_8078, pages_8077, pages_8076, pages_8094, pages_8075, pages_8064,
x-ua-compatible	IE=edge

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