Scan time: 2026-08-31 02:31:49
Overall Score
⚠ This website has serious GDPR deficiencies. Immediate action is required.
GDPR Issues Detected (4):
❌ 1 third-party server(s) outside the EU/EEA — data transfers without legal basis may violate Art. 44–49 GDPR.
Affected servers outside the EU:
❌ 1 tracking service(s) detected — without prior consent (opt-in) this violates Art. 6(1) GDPR.
Detected trackers:
⚠ No Content Security Policy — increased risk of cross-site scripting (XSS) and data theft.
⚠ Missing or unsafe Referrer-Policy — URLs containing personal data may be leaked to third parties.
Note: This automated analysis does not replace legal advice. For a complete GDPR assessment, consult a data protection officer.
↓ See detailed results for each category below.
The website uses an encrypted connection (HTTPS).
Latest encryption active (TLS 1.3 — TLSv1.3).
The security certificate is valid (expires 2026-11-08).
Strong encryption method (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 256 bit).
HSTS is enabled — the browser is instructed to always use the encrypted connection.
HSTS duration: 63072000 seconds (at least 1 year) — very good.
HSTS also applies to all subdomains (includeSubDomains).
No Content Security Policy (CSP) found. The website has no protection against injected malicious code.
A Content Security Policy (CSP) is a doorkeeper rule for the browser: "Scripts and styles may only be loaded from these allowed sources." Without CSP, injected malicious code (XSS) can freely fetch anything. Start with a simple, secure baseline.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ This policy is intentionally pragmatic (allows inline styles since many themes/plugins rely on them). If something breaks after enabling: F12 → Console shows "Refused to load…" — add the affected domain after script-src / img-src.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
# BEGIN WebForensik CSP
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik CSP⚠ WordPress often loads external scripts (Google Fonts, jQuery CDN, analytics pixel) — if CSP blocks them: open the console, see which domain is blocked, append that domain to "script-src 'self'" separated by a space.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'");
});⚠ If unsure: start with "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only" (only monitor, don’t block), watch violations in the console, then switch to enforced mode.
✓ How to verify it works: Open page, F12 → Console — no red "Refused to load…" messages. Network tab → first request → Response Header "content-security-policy" visible.
No Referrer-Policy set. When clicking external links, the full page URL is shared with other websites.
Without a Referrer-Policy the browser sends the full URL of your current page (incl. search terms, usernames in URL params) on every click to the destination site. Privacy-relevant per Art. 5 GDPR. Recommended safe setting: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
</IfModule>⚠ "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" is the modern standard: on cross-domain clicks only your origin (no path/params) is sent — internal clicks include the full URL. Stricter is "no-referrer" (send nothing) but it breaks some analytics tools.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
</IfModule>⚠ WordPress 4.9+ already emits a meta-tag with this policy, but the HTTP header above applies to all resources (images, scripts) — not only the HTML document.
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
});⚠ Always back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → first request → Response Headers — "referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin" must be present.
MIME type protection active (nosniff) — browsers will not misinterpret files.
No clickjacking protection. The website could be embedded in other pages to trick users.
Without clickjacking protection your site can be invisibly embedded into a malicious page ("enter your password here" — the click actually lands on your overlayed login form). Fix: set SAMEORIGIN (only your own domain may embed).
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "frame-ancestors 'self'"
</IfModule>⚠ Use both headers: X-Frame-Options for older browsers, frame-ancestors for modern ones. If you already have a CSP, add "frame-ancestors 'self'" there — don’t duplicate.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
</IfModule>⚠ If your site is intentionally embedded elsewhere (e.g. booking widget on partner sites): instead of SAMEORIGIN, list allowed domains via CSP: Header always set Content-Security-Policy "frame-ancestors 'self' https://partner.example.com"
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN');
});⚠ WordPress already tries to set X-Frame-Options — this hook deliberately overrides it.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN".
No Permissions-Policy set. Third-party scripts could access camera, microphone, or location.
Permissions-Policy controls whether scripts (including third-party) may access camera, microphone, location, motion sensors etc. GDPR-relevant because sensitive device APIs can otherwise be reached unnoticed.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=()"
</IfModule>⚠ "()" at the end means: no caller (not even your own page) may use this API. If you need geolocation (e.g. a map feature): use geolocation=(self) instead of geolocation=(). "interest-cohort=()" disables Google’s FLoC tracking.
File: .htaccess in the WordPress root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()"
</IfModule>⚠ Standard WordPress needs none of these APIs. If you use a plugin that needs the camera (QR scanner, video upload), set that API to "(self)".
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header('Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()');
});⚠ Back up functions.php before edits.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → Response Header: "permissions-policy" visible.
1 first-party and 0 third-party cookie(s).
1 of 1 cookie(s) without HttpOnly flag — could be read by malicious code.
Cookies without the "HttpOnly" flag can be read by JavaScript — an XSS attacker can steal session cookies and impersonate the logged-in user. Set HttpOnly for all cookies JavaScript doesn’t actively need.
File: .htaccess in the web root
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>⚠ Cleaner: set cookies with HttpOnly directly (PHP: setcookie(..., [..., 'httponly'=>true])). Exception: cookies that JS actively reads (e.g. some consent cookies).
File: functions.php of your CHILD theme (or better wp-config.php)
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
@ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');⚠ WordPress login cookies have been HttpOnly since 2.x. If you use a plugin that sets session cookies (e.g. WooCommerce cart pre-login), check its settings.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Application → Cookies → "HttpOnly" column shows checkmarks everywhere (except for deliberately JS-readable cookies like the consent cookie).
| Name | Domain | Encrypted | Server only | SameSite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pll_language | .relined.eu | Yes | No | Lax |
No local storage (Web Storage) used — no tracking risk.
19 request(s) to 7 different third-party servers.
1 third-party server(s) outside the EU/EEA — potentially problematic for GDPR compliance.
GDPR-relevant: visitor data (at least IP + User-Agent) is transmitted to servers outside the EU/EEA. Since the Schrems-II ruling (2020) this requires Standard Contractual Clauses + supplementary technical measures AND prior consent. Best fix: replace with EU alternatives where possible.
WordPress plugin: Common culprits and EU alternatives: Google Fonts → Bunny Fonts or self-host (plugin "OMGF — Host Google Fonts Locally"). Google Analytics → Matomo (self-hosted) or Plausible (EU servers). Google reCAPTCHA → hCaptcha (EU) or Friendly Captcha. Google Maps → OpenStreetMap. YouTube embeds → plugin "WP YouTube Lyte" loads only after click. CDN: Cloudflare → BunnyCDN (EU) or KeyCDN.
✓ How to verify it works: Load in incognito mode, F12 → Network → list all requests → check "Domain" column for non-EU servers. After migration no unrequested US domains should load.
6 third-party server(s) within the EU/EEA.
Requested URLs:
https://static.mailplus.nl/jq/ui/jquery-ui-1.12.1.custom.min.css?ver=7.1
https://static.mailplus.nl/jq/jquery.validate.1.19.3.min.js?ver=1.0
https://static.mailplus.nl/jq/ui/jquery-ui-1.12.1.custom.min.js?ver=1.0
... and 2 more request(s)
Requested URLs:
https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/cookieconsent@3/build/cookieconsent.min.css
https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/slick-carousel@1.8.1/slick/slick.min.js?ver=1.8.1
... and 1 more request(s)
Requested URLs:
https://consentcdn.cookiebot.com/consentconfig/4779e160-1f00-420b-8fa0-7045b8339dd3/settings.json
https://consentcdn.cookiebot.com/consentconfig/4779e160-1f00-420b-8fa0-7045b8339dd3/relined.eu/configuration.js
https://consentcdn.cookiebot.com/sdk/bc-v4.min.html
Requested URLs:
https://m19.mailplus.nl/genericservice/code/servlet/React?command=getFormJs&uid=111212&feid=hAEgMeWM4y2gVEtfy9ry&p=https&om=t&of=x&c=1&jq=3&ver=1.0
https://m19.mailplus.nl/genericservice/code/servlet/React?callback=jQuery33109578019577118727_1788136305649&command=getFormHtml&uid=111212&feid=hAEgMeWM4y2gVEtfy9ry&p=https&om=t&of=h&_=1788136305650
... and 1 more request(s)
Requested URLs:
https://consent.cookiebot.com/uc.js
https://consent.cookiebot.com/4779e160-1f00-420b-8fa0-7045b8339dd3/cc.js?renew=false&referer=relined.eu&dnt=false&init=false&culture=NL
Requested URLs:
https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/jquery/3.3.1/jquery.min.js?ver=7.1
... and 1 more request(s)
Requested URLs:
https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-WRPGS62
1 known tracker(s) detected! These track visitors across different websites.
Trackers (Google Analytics, Facebook Pixel, …) capture visitors and follow them across multiple sites. Under GDPR Art. 6 and ePrivacy / national implementations, explicit consent is required BEFORE loading the tracker. "Continued scrolling = consent" is NOT acceptable.
WordPress plugin: Consent plugins that properly block trackers until consent: "Complianz" (free, very good), "Real Cookie Banner", "Borlabs Cookie" (paid, most thorough). Principle after setup: do NOT embed the tracker snippet (e.g. GA script) directly in your theme — register it with the consent plugin, which only releases it after "Accept". Privacy-friendly tracker alternatives: Matomo (cookieless mode → may need no consent), Plausible (EU, anonymous, vendor claims no consent needed — legal advice recommended).
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito, load page — BEFORE "Accept": F12 → Network → no requests to google-analytics.com, facebook.com/tr etc. AFTER "Accept", yes.
Volentio JSD (Content): cdn.jsdelivr.net
0 of 11 external resource(s) use integrity verification (SRI).
Only some of your external resources (0 of 11) are protected by SRI. Add integrity attributes to the remaining ones too.
WordPress plugin: Approach: view page source → all <script src="https://…"> and <link href="https://…"> without integrity attribute → generate hash at https://www.srihash.org/ → add integrity="sha384-…" crossorigin="anonymous". Plugin "WP-SRI" automates many cases.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Console on page load: no "Failed to find a valid digest" messages. Source: all external <script>/<link> have an integrity attribute.
No external resources use integrity verification. Tampered files would not be detected.
SRI (Subresource Integrity) is a checksum in HTML that defines what an externally loaded file MUST look like. If someone tampers with the external file (e.g. a CDN gets compromised), the browser refuses to load it. You add the "integrity" attribute on the script/link tag.
WordPress plugin: In WordPress you can rarely add SRI hashes manually (scripts are queued via wp_enqueue_script()). Plugin "WP-SRI" (in the plugin directory) adds integrity hashes automatically for external scripts/styles. For statically embedded resources in your theme: generate the hash at https://www.srihash.org/, add integrity="sha384-…" and crossorigin="anonymous" on the <script>/<link> tag.
✓ How to verify it works: F12 → Network → requests with status 200 from CDN domains (cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdnjs.cloudflare.com etc.) → in HTML source the tag must contain "integrity=\"sha384-…\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"".
CAA records present: letsencrypt.org — only specified certificate authorities may issue certificates.
3 nameservers present — good redundancy.
IPv6 support present (AAAA records).
SPF record present: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.mailplus.nl ip4:82.94.168.233 ip4:217.67.237.163 ip4:217.67.241.2 — protects against email spoofing.
DMARC record present: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:it@relined.eu; ruf=mailto:it@relined.eu; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400 — email authentication active.
security.txt found: https://relined.eu/.well-known/security.txt
Contact field present (required) — security researchers can report vulnerabilities.
Expires field present (required).
Encryption information provided.
Preferred languages specified.
No external reporting endpoints detected.
Cookie consent system detected: Cookiebot, cookiebot.com.
Consent banner is visible to visitors.
Trackers are loaded on page load — possibly BEFORE consent is given.
Your trackers are loaded BEFORE the user can consent ("pre-consent loading"). Common misconfiguration in cookie plugins — banner appears, but too late: the GA script is already running. Violates ePrivacy.
WordPress plugin: Almost always caused by the theme or a tracking plugin that embeds the tracker code directly (e.g. "Google Analytics for WordPress" with auto-insert). Fix: 1) remove tracking code from the theme/plugin. 2) In the consent plugin (Complianz/Real Cookie Banner): register the tracker as a "service", paste the snippet there — the plugin will load it only after consent. 3) ALTERNATIVELY: plugin "PYS PixelYourSite" combined with consent gating. Do NOT rely on "GA anonymized before consent" — legally unsettled and risky.
✓ How to verify it works: Incognito → F12 → Network (clear all, start recording) → load page, do NOT click banner, wait 10 seconds → there must be NO requests to google-analytics.com, googletagmanager.com, facebook.com/tr, doubleclick.net etc.
Privacy policy linked: "privacyverklaring" (/privacy-statement/).
No legal notice (Impressum) found — required under German law (§ 5 DDG).
No imprint (legal notice) found — mandatory in Germany under § 5 DDG for all business-grade websites (and effectively for many other commercial sites in the EU). Even private blogs with ad or affiliate revenue typically require one. Violations are commonly targeted by warning letters.
WordPress plugin: Step 1: create an imprint. Free generator (German law): https://www.e-recht24.de/impressum-generator.html. Mandatory information includes: full legal name, postal address (no P.O. box), phone OR another second contact, email, for companies: trade register + VAT ID, supervisory authority if applicable, professional liability insurance if applicable. Step 2: in WordPress → Pages → Add New → title "Imprint" → publish. Step 3: footer menu → add "Imprint". IMPORTANT: the imprint must be "easily recognizable, directly accessible, permanently available" — a footer link satisfies this, an "About us" → "then imprint" does NOT.
✓ How to verify it works: Footer on every page → link "Imprint" or "Legal notice" visible → opens the imprint page with all mandatory information.
Privacy policy page is accessible (HTTP 200).
All missing security headers combined into one block. Append this block to the end of your .htaccess — done. 5 headers will be set.
The Content-Security-Policy above deliberately includes 'unsafe-inline' for both style-src and script-src. This does NOT provide full XSS protection — it's a pragmatic trade-off, not a bug.
Why? A typical WordPress setup (theme + 5-15 plugins) emits 10-50 different inline <script> blocks into the HTML: jQuery init, slider init, cookie banner, tracking, GTM, web vitals, lazy-load, speculation rules and so on. A strict script-src 'self' blocks them all — the site becomes visually and functionally broken (blank slider, broken cookie banner, dead plugins).
Consequence for scoring: Sites running WordPress with plugins can score at most ~75-85 points in the CSP category in this app — the full 100% rating is only achievable when inline code is signed via nonce or hash (technically demanding, breaks on every theme/plugin update).
Paths to full XSS protection (in increasing complexity):
Anyone who doesn't take one of these paths lives with 'unsafe-inline' — like about 95% of all production WordPress sites on the web. The other CSP directives still protect: default-src 'self' blocks external resources, object-src 'none' bans Flash/Java, frame-ancestors 'self' prevents clickjacking, base-uri 'self' prevents base-tag hijacking. Not maximum protection, but realistic protection for WP reality.
On Hetzner-Konsoleh webhosting (and comparable shared hosts like All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu, …), Apache throws a 500 Internal Server Error as soon as Header always edit Set-Cookie … expr=… appears in .htaccess. The Apache error log says:
Can't parse envclause/expression: syntax error, unexpected T_OP_STR_EQ, expecting $end
This is not a WebForensik bug and not a typo — the shared host has blocked the mod_headers expr= subset via AllowOverride limits (for security, because Header edit could also manipulate cookies of other tenants).
☛ For Hetzner-Konsoleh users: use the variant below marked with the red "Hetzner / Shared" badge. It consists of two files (.htaccess + wp-config.php) instead of one, but avoids the 500 error reliably. Cookie flags go into wp-config.php instead of .htaccess.
Append this block to the end of your .htaccess in the web root — done.
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen (nur wenn nicht schon gesetzt)
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>
This variant avoids the 500 Internal Server Error on Hetzner-Konsoleh and similar shared hosts (All-Inkl, IONOS, Strato, 1blu …): the .htaccess only contains the header directives (no "Header edit"), cookie flags move into wp-config.php. Two files to edit instead of one, but guaranteed to run.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
Insert ABOVE the line "/* That's all, stop editing! */". Back up wp-config.php first!
// === WebForensik: Cookie-Hardening (Hetzner-Konsoleh-tauglich) ===
// Bitte OBERHALB der Zeile "/* That's all, stop editing! */" einfügen.
// Wirkt auf PHP-Session- und WordPress-Login-Cookies.
// Plugin-eigene Cookies (z.B. WooCommerce, Cookie-Banner) müssen in den
// Plugin-Einstellungen separat auf "Secure" gestellt werden.
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
Insert this block ABOVE the "# BEGIN WordPress" line, otherwise WP overwrites it on permalink changes.
# BEGIN WebForensik Security
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()"
# Fehlende Cookie-Flags konditional ergänzen
Header always edit Set-Cookie "^(.*)$" "$1; HttpOnly" "expr=!(resp('Set-Cookie') -strmatch '*HttpOnly*')"
</IfModule>
# END WebForensik Security
If your host disallows .htaccess changes: append this PHP snippet to the end of your CHILD theme's functions.php. Back up first — NEVER edit the parent theme, it gets overwritten on updates.
add_action('send_headers', function () {
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' https: data:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
header("Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
header("X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN");
header("Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), interest-cohort=(), browsing-topics=()");
});
// Cookie-Flags für PHP-Session-Cookies — wirkt nur auf $_SESSION,
// NICHT auf von Plugins/Themes per setcookie() gesetzte Cookies.
// Für umfassende Cookie-Absicherung die .htaccess-Variante oben verwenden.
add_action('init', function () {
if (headers_sent()) return;
@ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
}, 1);
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| content-encoding | br |
| content-type | text/html; charset=UTF-8 |
| date | Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:31:45 GMT |
| link | <https://relined.eu/wp-json/>; rel="https://api.w.org/", <https://relined.eu/wp-json/wp/v2/pages/10853>; rel="alternate"; title="JSON"; type="application/json", <https://relined.eu/>; rel=shortlink |
| server | nginx |
| set-cookie | pll_language=nl; expires=Tue, 31 Aug 2027 00:31:44 GMT; Max-Age=31536000; path=/; domain=relined.eu; secure; SameSite=Lax |
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-pingback | https://relined.eu/xmlrpc.php |
| x-powered-by | PHP/8.2.33 PleskLin |